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THE CHARACTERISTICS AND VALUE-ADDED 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF PRIVATE INVESTORS 
TO ENTREPRENEURIAL SOFTWARE VENTURES
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ABSTRACT
The nature and role of early stage equity financing in the development of emerging entrepreneurial ventures 
in the software industry is examined. To provide an understanding of the relationship between the suppliers 
of capital and the ventures they bankroll, issues concerning equity positions and holding periods are 
addressed. Given the unique position of private investors in the early stage equity market, particular atten­
tion is given to the characteristics of these investors and the investor characteristics germane to the software 
industry Results for the software sector are compared with technology-based companies in an attempt to 
uncover any discemable differences between the two groups. The research hypothesizes that there are dif­
ferences in the informal venture capital market among broadly defined sectors in terms of the sectors’ tech­
nology and competitive conditions and their impact on: first, the need for, and timing of, external equity cap­
ital; and secondly, the characteristics and value-added contributions of the private investors attracted to the 
sector.
INTRODUCTION
The important role of the entrepreneurial firm in the creation of wealth and jobs, and the general problem in 
financing the growth of these ventures, has attracted considerable interest among researchers. For the estab­
lished fum, financial markets offer an array of financing instruments. These markets are relatively accessi­
ble to the established and larger firm, the managers of which are left to decide the optimum mix of debt and 
equity in its financial structure, based on value and cost of capital considerations. For the high growth entre­
preneurial fum, this supply assumption may not hold, causing systematic market mismatches at particular 
stages of development of the fast growth firm (Brophy, 1997). These imperfections, most notably in the 
informal venture capital market, are well documented, for both North America (Riding and Short, 1987; 
Haar, Starr and MacMillan, 1988; Gaston, 1989; Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 1994) and Europe (Landstrom, 
1992; Mason and Harrison, 1992a; Harrison and Mason, 1993; Landstrom, 1993), Market imperfections 
lead to market inefficiencies, and at least two inefficiencies in the equity financing market for entrepreneur­
ial ventures have been identified (Obermayer, 1983; Wilson, 1984). The first is a capital gap between the 
needs of early stage ventures and the suppliers of early stage capital. The significance of the capital gap is 
mitigated by the existence of private investors (Wetzel, 1983), and by the availability of capital and the lack 
of a quality deal flow to potential investors (Mason and Harrison, 1994; Stevenson and Coveney, 1994). The 
second, and more important, market inefficiency is an information gap. An efficient market implies an open 
and timely flow of reliable information concerning financing sources and investment opportunities. In the 
informal venture capital market, with the suppliers of capital seeking a degree of anonymity consistent with 
the need to maintain reasonable deal flow, information flows very inefficiently (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel,
John Freear • Center for Venture Research, University o f  N ew  Hampshire
Jeffrey E. Sohl* • Center for VenUire Research. Universit\- o f  New Hampshire. Durham, NH 03824
The Journal o f  E n trep ren eu ria l F in an ce  6( 1) Copyright© 2001 by A £ F - Academ y o f  Entrepreneurial Finance
ISSN: 1057-2287 A il rights o f  reproduction in any form is reserved.
84
1994; Mason and Harrison, 1996; K+V Organisatie adviesbureau bv and Entrepreneurial Holding bv, 1996). 
The sources of capital, most notably risk capital or equity, and the relative position of these sources during 
the growth stages of the entrepreneurial venture, have been examined over time. Previous studies identified 
private investors, commonly referred to as “business angels,” as the major source of equity capital in the seed 
and start-up stage (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 1995; Gaston and Bell, 1988; Wetzel, 1987). In contrast, insti­
tutional venture capital funds, the visible segment of the private equity market, tend to invest in fewer ven­
tures, later stages, and larger amounts, than their angel counterparts (Meyer et al., 1995; Timmons and 
Bygrave, 1997; Timmons and Sapienza, 1992). Bygraves and Timmons (1992) cited a trend on the part of 
venture capital funds out of the early seed and start-up phases, and observed that the “venture” seemed to be 
eroded from the institutional venture capital industry. While private investors and venture capital funds oper­
ate primarily in different stages, they do overlap and they are complementary. The informal private investor 
market provides seed and start-up external equity capital that helps spawn new ventures (Freear and Wetzel, 
1990). As the venture grows, however, it continues to outstrip its own ability to generate cash internally, and 
it begins also to outstrip the ability of individual investors, alone or in syndicates, to supply adequate addi­
tional equity capital to support growth. At this point, typically in the $ 1,000,000 to $2,000,000 range, pro­
fessional venture capital funds may take an interest in the venture. This is particularly the case if the venture 
has demonstrated some success and has progressed beyond the risk-laden seed and start-up stages towards 
potentially high and sustainable future growth and a not too distant exit horizon (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 
1994).
Several studies have examined the characteristics of private investors who participate in the early stage equi­
ty financing of entrepreneurial ventures. Most have used a convenience sample of one sort or another, and 
the present study is no exception. Typical angel profiles have been assembled (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 1997; 
Harrison and Mason, 1992; Kelly and Hay, 1996a; Riding and Short, 1989), and Mason and Harrison (1995b) 
provided an inter-country comparison of these profiles. However, the need to delineate private investor char­
acteristics along a broad spectrum has led researchers to recognize the diversity of angel traits. Gaston 
(1989) presented one of the earliest attempts at delineation through the development of a number of individ­
ual categories and market profiles. Freear, Sohl and Wetzel (1994) subdivided the population of high net 
worth individuals into three categories: business angels with experience investing in entrepreneurial ventures 
(habitual investors in new and/or existing ventures); interested potential investors with no venture investment 
history but who express a desire to enter the venture investment market; and uninterested potential investors 
who under no circumstances would consider investing in entrepreneurial ventures as part o f their investment 
strategy. Stevenson and Coveney (1994), in a survey of 500 British angels, developed a six category typol­
ogy based on entrepreneurial backgrounds and levels of investment. Mason and Harrison (1995a) defined 
an “archangel” as the key individual investor in the formation of angel syndicates. When such a key player 
is a financial intermediary, this relatively new member of the market is termed an “institutional archangel.” 
Sullivan (1991) provided an examination of angels along the entrepreneur/non-entrepreneur dichotomy. Also 
employing a two dimensional typology, Landstrom (1995) identified two extremes, passive investors who 
invest relatively small amounts of money and active investors who appear to operate in a more professional 
atmosphere than their passive counterparts. Restricting their analysis to serial investors (individuals who 
have made at least three private investments) Kelly and Hay (1996b) discussed two distinct investors: solo 
serial investors who invest on their own all the time; and syndicate serial investors who invest almost exclu­
sively with others. While much work on the informal venture capital market has been accomplished, there 
remain many aspects of the market that call for further study or refinement of previous work. In particular, 
little research has been undertaken on the study of the early stage equity market within a specific economic 
sector in an attempt to uncover any discemable differences that may be attributed to sectoral attributes.
This paper examines the nature and role of early stage equity financing in the development of emerging 
entrepreneurial ventures in one particular sector, the software industry. Within this context, h discusses the 
relationship between the sources of early stage capital. To provide an understanding of the relationship
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between the suppliers of capital and the ventures they bankroll, the paper addresses issues concerning equi­
ty positions and holding periods. Given the importance of private investors (“business angels”) in the early 
stage equity market, the paper pays particular attention to the characteristics of these investors and the 
investor characteristics germane to the software industry.. Through an analysis of early stage ventures in a 
specific economic sector, the research aims to uncover distinguishing sector-related market characteristics. 
In addition to those market characteristics unique to the software industry, the paper attempts to identify traits 
that the software industry shares in common with general technological-based ventures.
While emerging technology-based companies are prime candidates for equity financing, the research focus­
es on the software industry in an attempt to uncover differences between the software industry and the gen­
eral technology sector. The research hypothesizes that there are differences in the informal venture capital 
market among broadly defined sectors in terms of the sectors’ technology and competitive conditions and 
their impact on: first, the need for, and timing of, external equity capital; and secondly, the characteristics 
and value-added contributions of the private investors attracted to the sector. The unique characteristics of 
early stage software ventures, w'hich include relatively small initial capital requirements, the prevalence of 
bootstrapping and the robust formation of strategic alliances, provide the impetus for using the software ven­
ture as the unit of study. In addition, the dominant role of start-up ventures in the industry provide fertile 
ground for analysis. This role of start-up ventures in the software industry began with the industry frag­
mentation that occurred in the mid-1970s. The introduction of microprocessor-based personal computers in 
the 1970s helped usher in a period of transition in which demand for new software products led to the emer­
gence of many new companies. Today, start-up software ventures represent a dynamic force in the industry. 
While revenues continue to be concentrated in the top 5 to 10 companies in the industry, research and inno­
vations developed by start-up competitors have made significant contributions to the growth of the software 
industry (US International Trade Commission, 1995).
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SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The data collection for this study was achieved through a survey instrument mailed to the CEOs of software 
ventures that were members of the Massachusetts Software Council in 1995 and 1996. The survey elicited 
responses on external equity financing, the attributes of private investors and demographic information on 
the venture. One hundred and three usable surveys were returned. About one quarter of the original 756 ven­
tures to which the survey instrument was sent had existed for five or fewer years. Most (86%) were less than 
ten years old.
The survey methodology included a combination of mail and phone contacts with the CEOs of software ven­
tures. The four points of mail contact with potential respondents were: a letter introducing the nature and 
purpose of the research; the survey instrument accompanied by a cover letter; a second mailing to ventures 
that did not respond to the initial inquiry; and a post card reminding participants to complete the survey (see 
Table 1). Subsequent to these four contacts, the research team conducted a phone survey with a random sam­
ple of 324 of the remaining 602 non-respondents. The purpose of these phone contacts was to elicit respons­
es to the survey, to obtain an estimate of the size of the non-respondent pool, and to uncover reasons for their 
non-response. A summary of the results of this procedure is showTi in Table 2. The first four categories in 
Table 2 contain a total of 94 ventures, 29% of the sample of 324. This represents an estimate of 175 (29% 
of the 602 non-respondents) ventures that did not survive, ventures and these were removed from the poten­
tial non-respondents. The next four categories (a total of 72 ventures, 22% of the sample of 324) may also 
represent an estimate of 134 (22% of the 602 non-respondents) ventures that no longer existed. These ven­
tures also may be removed from the potential non-respondents. The result is a range of the size of the non­
respondent pool, which in turn provides a range for the response rate. Based on the above two classifica­
tions, the response rate for the survey is between 20% and 26%. Both of these response rates are
86
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TABLE 1
MAILINGS AND RETURNS
Two Mailings: 756
Returned to Sender: (51)
Total: 705
Number of Surveys Returned: 103
Original Non-Response Pool 602
Number of Ventures Contacted/Researched Through Direct Calls 324
sufficiently high to mitigate any effect of non-response bias on the results. In addition, an analysis of the 
responses between early and late respondents failed to reveal any significant differences between these two 
groups, further mitigating the potential for non-response bias.
PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS
For the ventures that responded, one-quarter had existed for five or fewer years and the majority of the ven­
tures was less than ten years old. The ventures were predominantly privately held corporations with a princi­
pal business (87% of the respondents) of software products (58%) or consulting (16%) or services (13%). 
During the early stages of the ventures, the competitive environment for their product or service divided 
almost equally among the three categories: completely new area, no competition (31%); competing against 
larger, more established ventures (39%); and competing against other equally sized ventures (30%). On aver­
age, the responding ventures had 25 employees the previous year, of whom 90% were full time. One year 
later, these ventures employed 32 people on average, representing a 28% increase in employment levels, with 
the percent of full time employees remaining about the same (87%). The respondents predicted that their 
total average employment would rise to 45 employees within the following twelve months, for an average 
increase of 4041%. Historical growth rates were largest for ventures employing fewer than 25 employees, 
with ventures in this group having predicted a robust 50% growth rate for the following year. In terms of 
revenue-generating products 57% of the ventures produced between 1 and 3 products, and 33% offered 
between 4 and 10 products. These ventures forecasted a 52% increase in revenue-generating products in the 
next year, with 30% of the ventures planning to add one new product, 19% anticipating two new products, 
and 17°/b expecting to bring between three and five products to market.
In general, the respondents represented venmres that were closely held private corporations predominantly 
offering software products and services within varying degrees of competitive market structure and across 
all stages of the developmental cycle for young ventures. These ventures exhibited substantial growth rates 
in employment and were plarming to bring several new products to market in the next year.
EXTERNAL EQUITY FINANCING
Equity investors in privately-held ventures provide seed, start-up and later stage financing to ventures that 
they believe to have high growth potential. The returns to these investors typically take the form of long-term 
capital gains, realized at the time of harvest through a variety of exit mechanisms. The purpose of this part 
of the research is to examine the extent of the role of equity in the development of the venmre and to
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TABLE 2 
RESULTS OF PHONE CONTACTS
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Company no longer in business: 14
Disconnected Phone/non-functioning phone: 31
Individual Unavailable: 36
Individual No Longer With Company: 13
Assumed to be ventures that did not survive (sub-total) 94 29%
Answering Machine (4 times): 61
No Answer (4 times): 4
No incoming calls to this number: 4
Out of New England Region: 3
Assumed to be ventures that no longer exist (sub-total) 72 22%
Questions did not apply to company: 21
Concerned about confidentiality of response: 2
Do not recall seeing survey/sent third copy: 47
Do not answer surveys: 6
Surveys require too much time: 53
Voice Mail only: 2
Refused After Delivery: 1
Incorrect Phone Number: 14
Decline to Participate/No Reason: 2
Had Survey and Would Return It: 4
Had Returned Survey: 3
Had Survey and Might Return It: 3
Other non-responses (sub-total) 158 49%
TOTAL: 324 324 100%
identify both the sources of equity and the associated cost. Although nearly one-half of the entrepreneurs had 
planned from the outset to raise outside equity capital, only 30 (29%) of the software ventures succeeded in 
this endeavor, a testimony to the arduous process of securing outside equity. Respondent comments on this 
endeavor ranged from the difficulty in securing the first meeting with potential investors to the importance 
of planning an adequate time horizon for the search for capital.
These thirty ventures raised outside equity capital in 69 rounds of financing, with private individuals being 
the source in 27 of the rounds. In another 27 of the rounds, venture capital funds were the source. Thus,
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nearly 80% of the rounds were accounted for by two sources. Corporate investors provided the majority of 
the remaining rounds of outside equity. Table 3 gives the details. For the 27 rounds of private individual 
financing, 10 rounds (37%) were seed financing, relatively small amounts of equity capital provided to the 
entrepreneur to prove a concept and to qualify for start-up capital. Fourteen rounds (52%) were start-up 
financing, typically considered to be equity capital provided to ventures completing product development and 
initial marketing. The remaining 3 rounds (11%) were later-stage financing defined as financing provided 
for full scale production or expansion of a company whose sales volume is increasing. The average amount
TABLES
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SOURCE, AMOUNT AND STAGE
Private Investors Venture Capital 
Funds
Seed Stage 10 37% 7%
Start-Up Stage 14 52% 16 59%
Later Stage 11% 33%
Total 27 100% 27 100%
Average amount raised per round $527,000 $1,164,000
Average ownership stake relinquished 18% 21%
raised per round where private investors were the principal source was $527,000. In contrast, for the 27 
rounds where venture capital funds were the source, 2 rounds (7%) were seed financing, 16 rounds (59%) 
were start-up financing, and 9 rounds (33%) were later-stage financing. The average amount raised per round 
was $1,164,000.
Data from the survey give added weight to two earlier research findings. First, it is clear that private investors 
tend to bring more than money to the ventures in which they invest (Ehrlich et al. 1994; Freear and Wetzel 
1992; Mason and Harrison 1992b). Nearly half of the respondents reported that they had reasons beyond the 
strictly financial for raising outside equity capital, the most common reason being that the investor would 
bring additional expertise, advice, contacts, and credibility to the venture. In this study these motivations 
beyond the strictly financial attest to the value-added component of the informal venture capital market. 
Secondly, the research provides added evidence to support the existence of a complementary relationship 
between private investors and venture capital funds (Freear and Wetzel, 1990). As the data suggest (Table 
3Figure 1 gives an overview sunmiary), private investors typically invest smaller amounts in earlier stages of 
software ventures. In contrast, the institutional venture capital market prefers later-stage, and consequently 
larger size, deals. This size and stage dichotomy between private investors and venture capital funds found 
in the software industry is consistent with previous research on equity financing of entrepreneurial ventures 
(Freear and Wetzel 1990; Freear, Grinde and Sohl 1997). As the current and previous research indicate, even 
in the best of times, venture capital fiinds are not the place to look for very early-stage financing. Research 
on early-stage investing has identified the informal venture capital market as the major source of seed and 
start-up equity financing for entrepreneurial ventures. The data suggest that this is also the case for software 
entrepreneurs.
Twenty-three of the thirty ventures that raised outside equity did so in multiple rounds of financing. 
Comparing round to round pairs, in 90% of the cases the time between financing rounds was less than two
89
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Figure 1
Private Investor and Venture Capital Fund Financing by Amount,
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years and in over half it was less than one year. In addition, neither the amount of dollars raised nor the 
source of the capital appeared to have had an impact on the elapsed time between successive rounds. In the 
high growth sector of the software industry, this short cycle investment process appears to be testimony to 
the rapidly changing environment of software development.
In terms of the ownership and control costs of outside equity, software ventures appeared to have been well 
positioned. After the first round of outside equity financing, the founding management team retained, on 
average, a 76% equity share of the venture. Figures 2 and 3
provide, respectively, the mean and median equity stakes of the founding management team before and after 
each financing round. Thus, the founding team relinquished less that one-quarter of the venture for an aver­
age first round of financing of $1,230,000. After a second round, with an average size of $2,071,000, the 
management team retained approximately half (54%) of the equity of the venture. In addition, there appear 
to have been no time-related effects on the size of the equity stake, with these percentages having remained 
relatively stable over the last decade. Recall that private investors participated in 27 rounds of financing, with 
an average amount raised per round of $527,000 (see Table 3). In order to secure this capital, the entrepre­
neur relinquished an average of 18% equity share in the venture. For the venture capital rounds (27 rounds 
at $1,164,000 per round), the average loss of ovraership and control was 21%. Thus, it appears that while the 
amount per round doubles, the loss of ownership and control percentage remains about the same. This appar­
ently counterintuitive result may be explained by the stage of the round. The private investor is the predom­
inant player in the seed and start-up stage, while venture capital funds tend to invest in later stage deals. In
90
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Figure 2
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these earlier rounds, the risk is likely to be greater than in later stage rounds. One would assume, however, 
that the total value of the firm is smaller at the early stage. This early stage combination of risk and
Figure 3
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valuation translates into a larger equity share for the dollar, at least in the software industry. In contrast, at 
the later stage, the risk of failure is less, at least in a relative sense, and the venture should have a higher value, 
other things equal, since the venture is further along the development cycle. Thus, the stage relationship of 
risk and valuation can explain the existence of an approximately equal ovmership and control cost for a 
larger capital.
In an attempt to gain some additional understanding of the process involved in raising equity capital, soft­
ware entrepreneurs were asked to provide details of the earliest round of outside equity financing that was in 
excess of $50,000. In half of the cases, private investors were the source of equity capital in this initial round 
of financing and venture capital ftmds were nearly a third. In addition, the rounds in this initial financing 
were approximately equally divided between seed and start-up financing. The ventures reported that, on 
average, a little over three and one-half months elapsed between the decision to seek ftinds and the first face- 
to-face conversation with an investor who later invested in the firm. Subsequent to this initial meeting, an 
additional six months usually elapsed before the receipt of funds. Figure 4 portrays data on the elapsed time 
from decision to meeting, meeting to ftmding, and total elapsed time. It appears that this six months period 
was consumed by the lengthy due diligence process involved in this type of early-stage investing.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
Figure 4
Elapsed Time Between Decision to Seek Funds and Receipt of
Funds
Responses Ordered by Total Elapsed Time (n=28)
Source: Survey Data/External Equity Financing/Questions 10 and 11.
Investors were similarly patient with respect to the length of time that they expected to hold the investment 
(see Table 4Figure 5), with 87% of the investors expecting to hold their investment up to seven years before 
cashing out. Investors expected to achieve a muhiple of their original investment in the neighborhood of 7 
times, or approximately a 32% annual compound rate of return on investment. Figure 6 shows the expected 
multiples of the original investment, and Figure 7 re-expresses those multiples as annualized percentages 
over the expected holding period. In the vast majority of cases (73%) investors did not specify an exit
92
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Figure 5
Expected Investor Holding Time 
(Earliest Financing Round in Excess of $50,000)
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Source; Survey Data/External Equity Financing/Question 8.
Strategy.
How did the software entrepreneur find this patient capital? Entrepreneurs reported that the best place to
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Figure 7
Annualized Return Based on Holding Period and Expected
Multiple
(n=24)
Source: Survey Data/External Equity Financing/Questions 8 and 9.
find first round investors was through friends, industry networks and contacts, followed closely by attorneys 
and other entrepreneurs (see Figure 8). They did not perceive bankers to be helpful in this process. In addi­
tion, while the source of angel financing was in general more than one investor, these investment groups were 
dominated by the presence of a lead investor. Thus, the search process for the software sector described in 
this research followed closely the description of the informal venture capital market for technology-based 
ventures in general (see, for example, Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 1990).
While outside equity capital was part of the financing base of 29% of the software ventures, what can be 
deduced about the remaining 71%, who by choice or necessity did not have external equity in their capital 
structure? The data indicate that there were many software entrepreneurs who had succeeded without exter­
nal equity financing. Recall that the software ventures in the study currently employed 32 people on aver­
age, representing a 28% increase in employment levels over the previous year. While employment growth 
rates for non-equity ventures (30%) appeared to be lower than for their equity based counterparts (35%), the 
difference was small. These conclusions were similar for both predicted employment growth (43% vs 47%) 
and forecast growth in the number of revenue generating products (51% vs 56%). The major difference 
between the two groups was in current employment levels, with non-equity ventures having employed, on 
average, 23 employees, and the equity ventures having been about twice as large (57 total employees). Thus, 
it appears that the lack of outside equity capital was not a major deterrent to the growth of software ventures, 
at least in the short term. Unfortunately, the effect of equity on long-term growth patterns cannot be 
ascertained from the data.
In a series of open-ended questions, software entrepreneurs expressed two sentiments that resonate through­
out the general early stage equity financing market for technology-based ventures. The first was a general 
wariness of the institutional venture capital industry that revolved around issues of a general lack of patience 
and compatibility. One possible explanation for these less than complimentary observations may lie in the 
nature of the industry. The institutional venture capital industry is the visible segment of the market, as
94
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
Figure 8
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opposed to the invisible informal market. This visibility attracts many unprepared and/or non-viable suitors 
to venture capital funds. Hence, rejection rates tend to be high, especially in light of the fact that the major­
ity of the ventures in this study were in the early stage of growth. With the preponderance of institutional 
venture capital funds focused on late-early to later stage financing, it was perhaps inevitable that entrepre­
neurs perceived a lack of patience and compatibility on the part of venture capital funds.
The second concern raised by entrepreneurs was the issue of control: that it is better to avoid or delay seek­
ing outside equity capital than to relinquish control at the early stage of the venture. As previous research 
indicates, the increasing rate of formation of business alliances and the role of bootstrapping offers innova­
tive ventures the potential for acquiring the use of resources without borrowing money or raising equity 
financing from traditional sources (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel 1995a). Thus, in an industry in which alterna­
tives to raising capital exist, entrepreneurs appear often to have taken advantage of business alliances and 
bootstrapping as a means of avoiding the loss of control inherent in raising external equity financing.
PRIVATE INVESTORS
Given the important role of private investors in the seed and start-up stage of software ventures, this research 
study attempted to elucidate both the role and the characteristics of these “business angels.” This study char­
acterized a private investor as an individual who provided outside equity financing through an “arms length” 
transaction. The reason for the “arms length” distinction was to exclude the commonly referred to “family,
95
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friends, and fools” from the private investor population.
Of the 30 ventures that raised $14 million in 27 rounds of outside equity capital from private investors six 
of the ventures had multiple rounds of angel financing. In multiple rounds, the most common was two or 
three rounds of private investor financing. For the twenty-seven rounds, an average of slightly more than 7 
investors participated in each round, confirming the notion that angels typically invest in groups. Almost 
three-quarters of the respondents noted the presence of a “lead” investor among the private investors. 
Excluding rounds in which there was only a single private investor, lead investors were to be found in rounds 
financed by as few as two and as many as 125 private investors. There are also examples of a venture being 
financed by 20 or 25 private investors, yet no lead investor was identified by the ventures.
A total of 219 private investors provided outside equity financing for 30 (27%) of the respondents, with most 
of the equity financing in the seed or start-up stage of the software venture. On average, each venture had 
nearly eight private investors, in addition to venture capital funds, as part of the external equity structure. Of 
these 219 private investors, 5053% had no role in the venture, other than that of receiving periodic financial 
statements and attending stockholder meetings (see Figure 9). However, several private investors participat-
Figure 9 
Investors' Roles in Ventures
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Source: Survey Data/Private Investors/Question 2.
ed in each round of financing (habitual private investors), and in all but one case (involving only one investor) 
angels engaged in multiple activities to assist in the development and growth of the venture. This 
value-added contribution of angel investors took several forms. For these active investors, 2625% provided 
informal advice as needed, access to additional financing, and/or access to industry contacts and resources., 
and 20% had representation on the Board of Directors, the two most common avenues for involvement. To 
a lesser extent, private investors provided access to relevant industry resources and contacts, provided access 
to additional financing sources, and were employees of the firm. Through their active involvement in the 
firm, these private investors represented a value-added approach to investing. While the activity of early
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Stage investors was noted, did entrepreneurs view this activity as a net benefit or a net cost of external 
equity financing? Seventy percent of the entrepreneurs considered their relationship with private investors 
to be productive (see Table SFigure 10) and 8% viewed the advice as a net additional cost of the transaction.
What allowed these angels to be in a position to establish both active and productive relationships with the
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Figure 10
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10
ventures in which they had invested? The software entrepreneurs indicated that over half of their private 
investors possessed knowledge germane to the software industry, with 27% having knowledge of software 
technology and 25% having knowledge of software markets (see Figure 11). In addition, 46% of the private 
investors had general business experience. Nearly one-quarter of the angels were helpftil in financial man­
agement issues, a quality critical in the early stages of development of a high growth venture. The data 
appear to indicate that general business skills were the important value-added contribution of angels. Since 
early stage technology-based ventures are unlikely to be short of technology but are likely to be short of gen­
eral management expertise, angels were perceived to be providing the “know-how” where it was needed. 
Further facilitating the active investing role of angels, over half (51%) of the investors lived within a half-day 
travel time of the venture. Note that the estimate (51%) included all investors. It is surmised that a signifi­
cantly larger proportion of active investors lived close to the venture, as opposed to all investors (both active 
and passive). This close proximity to the venture afforded the entrepreneur convenient access to the know­
how of experienced investors. For the active investor, the ability to monitor the investment and provide assis­
tance in growing the business was enhanced through close proximity to the venture.
CONCLUSION
This study set out to uncover both the myths and the realities that exist in the early stage development of 
software ventures by examining the fi*equency and characteristics of successftii early stage equity financing 
strategies. Through an understanding of these ventures the research offers the next generation of innovative 
ventures guidance on the early stage strategies employed by successful software entrepreneurs.
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Figure 11 
Private Investor Characteristics
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Source: Survey Data/Private Investors/Question 4.
Close to half of the software entrepreneurs planned to raise outside equity, with only a third succeeding in 
this endeavor. For those that did secure equity financing, smaller amounts in earlier stages of the software 
venture were provided by private investors. In contrast, institutional venture capital funds preferred later 
stage, and consequently larger size, deals. This size and stage dichotomy between private investors and ven­
ture capital funds that exists in the software industry is confirmed by current research on the equity financ­
ing of technology-based entrepreneurial ventures (Freear, Grinde, and Sohl, 1997). In terms of the cost of 
this equity, software ventures appear to be well positioned, with the founders typically having relinquished a 
24% equity share for a first round of financing, as compared to a 30% equity share for the technology ven­
tures as a whole. While outside equity was important to the quarter of the ventures that successfiilly engaged 
in the process, those ventures without equity financing appeared to experience somewhat smaller (but still 
quite strong) growth rates, at least in the short term. It appears that these non-investor backed ventures tend­
ed to rely on bootstrapping and, to a lesser extent, on business alliances, for a longer period of time than their 
equity financed counterparts. However, ventures with external equity were approximately twice as large as 
non-equity ventures in terms of the number of employees.
Private investors played a vital role in the financing of the early stage software ventures studied. In 
addition to capital, these investors added value to the venture through their active involvement in the devel­
opment of the venture, including participation in more than one financing round. This value was derived 
from experience in start-up ventures and knowledge and contacts germane to the industry. As in other tech­
nology-based ventures, the software entrepreneurs considered their relationships with investors to be a pro­
ductive one. In keeping with current research on start-up ventures in general, holding periods of 5-7 years 
confirmed the notion that angels provide patient capital, and the expected returns for these ventures (32% 
compound annual rate of return on investment) conformed to general new venture returns. Angels invested 
in groups with friends and associates, usually with a lead investor, and it appeared that the number of 
investors per round in the software industry was larger than in the technology sector as a whole. The private
investor market found itself once more to be largely a regional phenomena, with over half of the investors 
living close to the investment, and probably with an even larger percentage of the lead investors located with­
in a day’s travel time of the investment.
This research represents an attempt to delineate the early stage equity investing market along economic sec­
tors. While in many instances the software sector reflects general technology industry market characteris­
tics, certain characteristics distinguish the software industry. While researchers are continually developing 
the knowledge base for the early stage equity financing market, attempts to study this market along sectoral 
dimensions may lead to insights that benefit both the specific sector and the market as a whole.
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